<?xml version="1.1" encoding="utf-8"?>
<article xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://jats.nlm.nih.gov/publishing/1.1/xsd/JATS-journalpublishing1-mathml3.xsd" dtd-version="1.1" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">IED</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title>International Economy and Development</journal-title></journal-title-group><issn>2995-4339</issn><eissn>2995-4355</eissn><publisher><publisher-name>Art and Technology</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.61369/IED.2025040028</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Article</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title>家族信任不能替代制度约束：基于紫天科技治理失效的案例研究</title><url>https://artdesignp.com/journal/IED/3/4/10.61369/IED.2025040028</url><author>唐琴</author><pub-date pub-type="publication-year"><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>3</volume><issue>4</issue><history><date date-type="pub"><published-time>2025-04-20</published-time></date></history><abstract>本文以因财务造假退市的紫天科技为例，研究中国部分民营上市公司以&amp;ldquo;家族信任&amp;rdquo;全面取代&amp;ldquo;制度约束&amp;rdquo;所导致的治理失效问题。通过多理论视角分析成因，并深入案例剖析其决策、监督、信息及文化机制在家族化治理下的失灵过程。最终从企业、监管与投资者三方面提出构建&amp;ldquo;制度为本、信任为辅&amp;rdquo;的现代治理体系路径。案例表明，缺乏制度约束的家族信任易引发财务舞弊与治理危机。</abstract><keywords>家族信任,制度约束,公司治理,财务舞弊,紫天科技</keywords></article-meta></front><body/><back><ref-list><ref id="B1" content-type="article"><label>1</label><element-citation publication-type="journal"><p>[1] 蔡庆丰, 陈熠辉, 李超." 父爱主义" 还是" 代理人冲突" ？&amp;mdash;&amp;mdash; 大股东治理与上市公司股价崩盘风险[J]. 金融研究,2020.(11),188&amp;ndash;206.[2] 储小平. 家族企业研究：一个具有现代意义的话题[J]. 中国社会科学,2004. (5),51&amp;ndash;58.[3] 李维安, 郝臣. 公司治理研究的新进展：国际趋势与中国模式[J]. 南开管理评论,2019.22(5),4&amp;ndash;13.[4] 申明浩, 宋丽红. 家族主义、制度环境与民营企业治理[J]. 管理世界,2017.(2),76&amp;ndash;91.[5] 谢绚丽, 于胜道, 王诗雨. 二代涉入如何影响家族企业创新？&amp;mdash;&amp;mdash; 基于社会情感财富的视角[J]. 管理世界,2021.37(9),12&amp;ndash;26..[6] 周婷婷, 郑志刚. 控股家族" 垂帘听政" 与公司决策[J]. 经济学( 季刊),2021. 21(4),143&amp;ndash;162.[7] 朱琪, 黄祖辉. 中国家族企业治理研究述评[J]. 管理世界,2019. 35(12),106&amp;ndash;125.[8]Villalonga, B , Amit, R. Family firms. The Journal of Finance, 2020. 75(3), 1331&amp;ndash;1379.[9]G&amp;oacute;mez-Mej&amp;iacute;a, L. R, Haynes, K. T, N&amp;uacute;&amp;ntilde;ez-Nickel, M, Jacobson, K. J. L, , Moyano-Fuentes, J. Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills. Administrative Science Quarterly, (2007). 52(1), 106&amp;ndash;137.[10]La Porta, R, Lopez-de-Silanes, F, , Shleifer, A. Corporate ownership around the world. The Journal of Finance,1999.54(2), 471&amp;ndash;517.[11]Chrisman, J. J, Chua, J. H, , Litz, R. A. Comparing the agency costs of family and non-family firms: Conceptual issues and exploratory evidence. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2004. 28(4), 335&amp;ndash;354.[12]Eisenhardt, K. M. Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review,1989.14(1), 57&amp;ndash;74.</p><pub-id pub-id-type="doi"/></element-citation></ref></ref-list></back></article>
